周波：无论特朗普怎么粉饰，太空武器化没有赢家

Club提要：2026年9月，美国太空军首次公开承认已部署在轨空间武器，引发全球太空安全格局深刻震荡。 清华大学战略与安全研究中心研究员周波日前在《南华早报》发表评论指出，当前围绕太空治理存在两大对立立场：中国、俄罗斯及广大全球南方国家呼吁达成具有法律约束力的条约全面禁止太空武器化，而美国主导的西方阵营则坚持太空军事化不可逆转，主张以不具约束力的“负责任行为规范”替代刚性军控约束。 周波认为，太空战争将不可避免升级为全面冲突，且几乎必然卷入核武器使用风险，太空大战不存在单方面赢家，最终将使全人类承担共同的安全代价。

《南华早报》截图

【文/周波，翻译/北京对话 柳润东】

9月14日，美国太空军宣布“美国已部署在轨太空控制武器，能够保护联合作战部队免受敌对对手的攻击”时，我不禁想起牛顿那句广为人知的感叹：（我能计算天体的运行），却无法计算人性的疯狂。

这是历史上首次有国家公开承认在外层空间部署武器。当前近地轨道已呈拥挤化、竞争化态势：多国在轨开展监视侦察、导弹预警、卫星通信、导航定位等军事活动。美国是目前唯一将太空军设为独立军种的国家，而中国、俄罗斯、英国、法国、日本等其他国家，也均已组建专职太空作战力量。

但上述国家均未公开承认部署天基轨道武器，不愿承受将外层空间变为战场所引发的全球范围反弹。1967年《外层空间条约》已明确禁止在外层空间部署核武器；任何其他类型武器的部署，同样会招致国际社会的广泛批评。

各国刻意回避讨论太空武器化议题的另一原因，是当前国际社会对“何为太空武器”尚无明确定义。这或许正是五角大楼始终泛泛使用“慑止对手能力的动能与非动能手段”这一模糊表述、拒不披露具体细节的原因。

简言之，太空对抗技术可分为四类：一是共轨武器，通过匹配目标卫星轨道对其持续跟踪，以撞击或爆炸方式致盲目标；二是直接上升式武器，不进入目标轨道即可对过境卫星实施打击；三是定向能武器（如激光、高功率微波），可瞬间瘫痪卫星功能；四是电子与网络攻击手段，通过信号干扰、入侵攻击破坏卫星及配套地面系统。

当前太空安全领域仍存在一个核心灰色地带——具备民用属性的系统可被转作军事用途。例如，一颗普通民用卫星只要伸出机械臂抓捕其他航天器，即可瞬间转化为进攻性武器。

如今，全球太空安全议题的讨论日益被两种针锋相对的立场所主导：一方主张禁止太空武器化，另一方则强调负责任的行为规范。近二十年来，中国、俄罗斯以及广大全球南方国家始终呼吁缔结一项具有法律约束力的条约，全面禁止太空武器化。

而美国主导的西方阵营则认为，太空军事化进程已不可逆转，国际社会应转而聚焦建立不具法律约束力的“负责任行为规范”。换言之：既然不可能让繁忙道路完全禁行，至少可以制定规则避免撞车事故。

中国并不反对建立“负责任行为规范”的倡议。2021年，两颗SpaceX“星链”卫星（7月的星链-1095、10月的星链-2305）在中国空间站驻有航天员期间，对空间站实施了危险的近距离抵近，其突发轨道变轨动作迫使空间站启动紧急避撞机动。既然普通商业卫星都能造成如此严重的安全风险，专用太空武器将使这类危险呈指数级放大。

美、俄、中、印四国均已在低地球轨道开展反卫星武器试验——这类试验应该全面停止。即便仅打击少量卫星，也会产生规模庞大、长期滞留轨道的空间碎片，这进一步加剧了国际社会对“凯斯勒综合征”的担忧：即轨道碰撞持续连锁反应，最终可能导致所有国家无法使用低地球轨道。

作为全球第一太空大国，美国在太空战争中的损失将最为惨重：其在轨运行的活跃卫星超过10600颗，SpaceX更是计划最终部署多达42000颗卫星。

太空武器化是特朗普总统“金穹”导弹防御项目的核心组成部分。该系统设计高度依赖天基拦截弹，原因是陆基防御系统无法在导弹短暂的助推段实现可靠拦截；唯有天基平台才能实现持续全球覆盖，在导弹发射后即刻实施摧毁。

特朗普总统和他的“金穹”导弹防御项目（资料图）

然而，特朗普所谓“美国必须主宰太空”的宣称，本质上只是一厢情愿的战略幻觉。撇开该项目天量成本与极端技术难度不谈，没有任何防御系统能够同时全面应对弹道导弹、机动高超声速飞行器、部分轨道轰炸系统、军民两用卫星构成的全谱攻击。

稍作推演即可预判：太空战争将不可避免升级为大规模全面冲突。针对卫星的打击绝不会局限于太空，而是会立即瘫痪地面关键国家基础设施，触发跨域报复，将各方拖入全谱战争。

且任何太空冲突都不可能停留在常规战争范畴内，几乎必然是核战争的组成部分或序幕。大国针对对手太空资产的打击不可能隐蔽，必将招致压倒性报复。

“核战争打不赢，也绝不能打。”这是冷战核军备竞赛换来的沉痛共识，五个核武器国家至今仍在官方层面坚持这一原则——至少在纸面上如此。

值得注意的是，冷战时期尽管两大超级大国存在数十年尖锐地缘对抗，仍能在和平太空探索领域开展合作，其中最具代表性的就是“阿波罗-联盟测试计划”——人类历史上首次国际载人航天任务。

极具讽刺意味的是，即便冷战时期的对抗双方都有智慧避免的太空武器化进程，如今却正在我们眼前上演。在牛顿坦言无法测算人类疯狂的三百年后，这份疯狂已经抵达星空。沿这条自我毁灭的道路前行，已不只是战略失误——这是我们亲手制造的末日情景。

（翻页查看英文）

Whatever Trump claims, weaponisation of space makes losers of us all

When the US Space Force announced on September 14 that “the US has on-orbit space control weapons capable of defending the Joint Force against hostile adversary action”, I thought of Isaac Newton’s well-known declaration that he could not calculate the madness of people.

are congested and contested with many nations conducting military activities, such as surveillance and reconnaissance, early missile warning, satellite communications and navigation. While the United States stands alone with an independent Space Force as a full separate service, many other states such as China, Russia, Britain, France and Japan have built dedicated space combat organisations.

However, none of them has publicly acknowledged deploying on-orbit space weapons, unwilling to face the global backlash against turning outer space into a battlefield. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty already bans nuclear weapons in space. Deploying any other weapon will also draw widespread international criticism.

Another reason people have refrained from talking about the weaponisation of space is because there is no clear definition of what constitutes a space weapon. That is probably why the Pentagon vaguely refers to “kinetic and non-kinetic means to affect adversary capabilities”, without spelling out specific details.

In simple terms, counter-space technology falls into four categories: co-orbital weapons match the target satellite’s orbit, track it closely, and disable it through impact or explosion; direct-ascent weapons strike passing satellites without entering their orbits; directed-energy tools, such as lasers and high-power microwaves, cripple satellite functions in an instant; electronic and cyber tools jam signals or hack both satellite and ground systems.

And a major grey zone still exists – systems that have a civilian purpose can be used for military purposes. For example, an ordinary satellite can instantly turn into an offensive weapon if it extends a robotic arm to seize other spacecraft.

Two opposing views now dominate global space security debates: no weaponisation vs responsible behaviour. For nearly two decades, China, Russia and many Global South countries have called for a legally binding treaty to ban space weaponisation entirely.

The US-led Western bloc, however, argues that space militarisation is inevitable, so the world should instead focus on establishing non-binding “responsible behaviours”. In other words, it is impossible to empty a busy road of all traffic, but rules can still be set to prevent crashes.

China is not against the idea of “responsible behaviours”. In 2021, two SpaceX Starlink satellites – Starlink-1095 in July and Starlink-2305 in October – made dangerously close approaches to China’s space station while Chinese astronauts were on board. Unexpected orbital shifts forced the station to execute emergency collision-avoidance manoeuvres. If ordinary commercial satellites can create such severe risks, dedicated space weapons would only amplify these dangers exponentially.

The United States, Russia, China and India have all tested anti-satellite weapons in low-Earth orbit – and these tests need to stop. Even attacking a small number of satellites produces massive, long-lasting space debris. This fuels growing concerns over the Kessler Syndrome, a catastrophic chain reaction where continuous orbital collisions could render low-Earth orbit unusable for every country on Earth.

The US stands to lose the most in a space war as the largest spacefaring nation. It operates over 10,600 active satellites and SpaceX aims to eventually have up to 42,000 satellites.

Space weaponisation is a core part of President Donald Trump’s Golden Dome project for missile defence. Its design hinges on space-based interceptors because ground-based defences cannot reliably hit missiles during their brief boost phase. Only orbital platforms can deliver persistent global coverage to destroy rockets soon after launch.

Yet, Trump’s claim that “we must have American dominance in space” is nothing more than a fantasy. Leaving aside its astronomical costs and extreme technical difficulties, no defensive system can fully counter the full spectrum of attacks by ballistic missiles, manoeuvrable hypersonic vehicles, fractional orbital bombardment systems and dual-use satellites at the same time.

It takes little imagination to realise a space war would inevitably escalate into a large-scale, all-out conflict. Strikes targeting satellites would not remain confined to space; they would immediately cripple critical national infrastructure on the ground, triggering cross-domain retaliation and dragging adversaries into a full-spectrum war.

And no conflict in space can remain confined to conventional warfare. It is almost surely part of a nuclear war or a prelude to it. Any major-power strike against rival space assets is impossible to conceal and will invite overwhelming retaliation.

“A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” This hard-learned consensus emerged from the Cold War nuclear arms race, and all five nuclear-armed states still officially uphold this principle, at least on paper.

It is interesting to note that during the Cold War, despite decades of bitter geopolitical rivalry, the two superpowers still managed to cooperate in peaceful space exploration, most notably the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project – humanity’s first international crewed space mission.

It is a bitter irony, then, that the weaponisation of space – which even the Cold War rivals had the wisdom to avoid – is unfolding before our eyes. Three centuries after Newton admitted he could not calculate the madness of men, that madness has reached the stars. To march down this self-destructive path is not merely a strategic error; it is a doomsday scenario of our own making.

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